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EXPANSIVE DISCLOSURE: REGULATING 
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING FOR FUTURE 
ANALYSIS AND REFORM 
RACHEL DENAE THRASHER* 
Abstract: Third-party funding (TPF) is a relatively new phenomenon in the field 
of international investment arbitration. TPF takes place when a non-party to a 
dispute provides funding to one of the parties (usually the claimant) in return for 
a percentage of the amount recovered. International investment arbitration is a 
unique context, however, because investor-states dispute settlement puts States 
always in the role of respondent and private investors in the role of claimants. 
Despite this apparent imbalance, TPF proponents argue, among other things, that 
it provides much needed access to justice for poorer clients and adds value to the 
system by providing a more disinterested evaluation of legal arguments. Those 
claims do not stand up to the facts as we have them, however. There have been 
several efforts to regulate TPF, including mandatory disclosure rules (applied on-
ly to the identity of the funder) and more expansive discretionary disclosure. 
These efforts do not go far enough. Instead, we need mandatory expansive dis-
closure of the identity of the funder and key terms of the funding agreement. This 
will provide scaffolding to the international investment arbitration system by 
avoiding conflicts of interest, aligning with institutional interests in transparency, 
and providing data for ongoing empirical research. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a truth, universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a 
good fortune, must be in want of a wife. 
—Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 
It might be equally true, however, that a person in possession of a good 
fortune will seek new ways to grow that fortune. The Financial Crisis dried up 
certain financial markets for a time, leaving some corporations and investors to 
seek new avenues for building wealth, both for themselves and for their share-
holders. One such avenue is commonly called third-party funding (TPF), in 
which an individual or corporation outside of a legal dispute provides financ-
ing to one of the parties—usually the claimant. In return, the non-party may 
receive a return on the amount of the claim recovered, if any (ICCA-QMUL 
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2017). What began in the context of domestic litigation, first in Australia, then 
in the United States and Great Britain, has taken root in other jurisdictions 
around the world—such as Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as certain coun-
tries in Latin America and Europe. It has also burst from the narrow context of 
domestic litigation and arbitration, into the realm of international commercial 
arbitration and international investment arbitration. 
Historically, common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty had 
kept third-parties from participating financially in legal disputes. Outside of 
contingency fee arrangements, which played the primary role of increasing 
access to justice in the United States and elsewhere, the judicial system viewed 
other sources of funding with suspicion (Flake 2015, citing Martin 1999). 
Some attribute the introduction of TPF into the domestic litigation practice to 
both demand-side and supply-side sources. In addition to the rising costs of 
litigation, there has been a shortage of capital through more traditional forms 
of lending for litigation (Flake 2015, citing Beisner, et al., 2009). Likewise, 
investors gained an interest in “alternative capital outlets, where returns would 
not be correlated to traditional markets” (ICCA-QMUL 2017). Through pres-
sure from potential funders and (possibly) an increased demand for additional 
funding opportunities from claimants, the common-law jurisdictions intro-
duced statutory reforms permitting (and regulating) TPF. 
On first glance, the availability of TPF (almost) uniquely to the claimants 
in any case, seems to place a thumb on one side of the scales of justice. In do-
mestic litigation and arbitration, and even in international commercial disputes, 
TPF’s effect may be more complex. In those cases, individuals and corpora-
tions may be on either side of a dispute. And even if they are brought before a 
tribunal as defendants on a contract claim, they may also be able to have ac-
cess to TPF for any related counterclaims in the case. In short, private disputes 
do not only have a claimant and a defendant, but often two claimants and two 
defendants, affording both parties access to this type of funding. 
The one unique context in which this presents a problem is international in-
vestment arbitration. In international investment treaties, as I discuss in more 
detail below, countries are always the respondents and private investors and cor-
porations are always the claimants. The treaties impose no obligations on the 
private individuals which would make room for counterclaims. In that case, TPF 
is truly only available to one side of the system. This creates distinctive chal-
lenges for the states involved. This Essay begins with a thorough look at the ex-
tensive empirical analysis of investment arbitration, followed by a point-by-point 
inquiry into the arguments in favor of TPF. From that, I argue first that TPF suf-
fers from a severe lack of access to information, that is, from a severe lack of 
transparency. Although the practice is currently permitted, we ought to seek ex-
pansive disclosure of TPF in the International Investment Arbitration context. 
Second, I argue that we ought not to stop at that, but instead we should use the 
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information gathered from that expansive disclosure to push against the status 
quo inasmuch as the data shows that TPF is not serving the goals of international 
investment agreements, or is resulting in unexpected side-effects. 
I. UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN AN IMBALANCED SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF 
TPF IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
TPF is problematic largely because of its presence in an already imbal-
anced system. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has been a staple of 
international investment disputes since the Germany-Pakistan Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (BIT) in 1959. In 1966, the World Bank created the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an institution estab-
lished specifically for resolving these investor-state conflicts outside of the 
domestic court systems. In those early years, the system acted as a much-
needed protection for foreign direct investors providing capital, employment 
and infrastructure to the developing world. Its value lay “in its role as a re-
straint against unjustified expropriation or unfair treatment when governments 
changed political direction” (Schultz & Dupont 2015). As Gus Van Harten has 
pointed out, many of the earliest arbitrations “followed in the wake of foreign 
invasion or occupation” (Schultz & Dupont 2015, quoting Van Harten 2007). 
The system did not gain much traction, however, until the mid-1990s, 
when the number of BITs and modern free trade agreements (containing in-
vestment commitments) began to boom. In addition to investor protection, in-
vestment treaties became a signal, a “welcome mat,” that developing countries 
could put out indicating that they were open for business. Including ISDS in 
the treaties helped governments “credibly commit to allow foreign investors to 
operate on their soil without undue interference” (Wellhausen 2016). Corre-
sponding to the increase in the number of investment treaties, the average 
number of claims filed per year skyrocketed from under 5 (before 1994), to 
between 30 and 50 after the year 2000 (Schultz & Dupont 2015). 
A. Structural Imbalance 
Many people today argue that the presence of ISDS “tilts the scales too 
far” in favor of the investors (Wellhausen 2016). Structurally speaking, in-
vestment treaties are simply contracts between states that impose obligations 
on those states. The citizens of each state stand only as third-party beneficiar-
ies and cannot be bound by obligations directly under the treaty. The pream-
bles of many treaties highlight this tendency. In fact, investor-state arbitral tri-
bunals have, in several instances, relied on the preamble to conclude that “the 
sole purpose of the treaty is the protection of the investor in order, presumably, 
to attract higher levels of investment” (SADC 2012). The substantive language 
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of the treaty is also one-sided—protecting investors without safeguarding the 
host state (Schultz & Dupont 2015). 
Consequently, in ISDS, investors are always the claimants and states are 
always the respondents. While, by itself, “this is a significant element of 
asymmetry in the system,” some argue that the asymmetry is “not terribly rele-
vant” (Schultz & Dupont 2015, quoting Alvarez 2011). If we assume that the 
investor is incredibly vulnerable under the domestic legal system of the host 
state, then ISDS is “nothing but the reverse mirror image of the investors’ ex-
posure to the host state’s [sovereign regulatory power]” (Schultz & Dupont 
2015, quoting Alvarez 2011). 
The presence of TPF, however, changes the calculus here. Even if Alvarez 
is right and the system is well-balanced, some TPF practitioners would argue 
that large sums of money flowing to one side can throw off that balance.  Fur-
thermore, as some research has shown, filing matters. Even states that ulti-
mately win the arbitration experience the negative consequences of being in-
volved in the system, such as a decrease in foreign direct investment and in the 
sovereign bond market (Wellhausen 2016). If TPF increases the likelihood that 
an investor will bring a case under the investment treaty, states are more vul-
nerable to these consequences. Finally, even if state parties won a vast majority 
of the time, the cost of arbitration is a particular concern for lower income 
countries who have become the target of an investor-state dispute. The rise of 
TPF and other funding sources for investment arbitration has risen concurrent-
ly with the costs of these cases, and the impact of such cash flow has not yet 
been studied empirically in this context. 
Several studies have examined the outcomes in investment arbitration and 
determined that the results are split approximately 3 ways—1/3rd of the time 
states win, 1/3rd of time states lose and 1/3rd of the time states settle (Sweet, et 
al. 2017, Wellhausen 2016, Schultz & Dupont 2015).1 Researchers disagree 
about how to treat settlements, however, as the settlement agreements are not 
available to the public and it is not immediately clear which party benefits the 
most from such a result. On the one hand, settlement could be viewed as a loss to 
states, since they still have to pay the investors some amount for the alleged trea-
ty violation. On the other hand, the cost to settle is likely much lower than the 
cost to go through with the suit, especially if the state thinks it will lose. While it 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Unfortunately, we cannot measure the number or percentage of awards that the investors or 
states should have won, as it would require second-guessing the facts and legal arguments of hundreds 
of investment cases (Schultz & Dupont 2015). On average, claimants who won their case, were only 
awarded 30%–40% of the amount initially claimed (Wellhausen 2016). One could argue that claim-
ants either inflate awards requests, knowing that they will get a small percentage of that, or that tribu-
nals do a good job of constraining damage claims against states (Wellhausen 2016). Ultimately, how-
ever, we do not know. 
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is not clear that as a rule ISDS prefers investors’ claims over states’ interests, 
states (and their taxpayers) will be paying some amount 2/3rd of the time. 
B. Practical North-South Imbalance 
While the overall data on outcomes may not point unequivocally to ISDS 
outcomes strongly favoring investors, further research shows that for countries 
most vulnerable to the high costs of investment arbitration, these global trends 
obscure the true story. First, a vast majority of all claimant investors are from 
high income countries (88%). While respondent countries are more diverse than 
the home states of the claimants, the bulk of all claims are filed against states 
that are upper middle or middle-income countries. Additionally, from 1998-
2010, 46% of high-income respondent states prevailed, but only 27% of low-
income states won (Schultz & Dupont 2015). Another study showed that by the 
end of 2014, OECD states won 55% of the time, which is well above the 33% 
average, suggesting that the even 1/3rd split is not fully telling the story. 
Proponents of ISDS credit the “good behavior” of countries like the Unit-
ed States, contrasted with the “fast and loose behavior” exhibited toward for-
eign investors by countries like Argentina (Hufbauer 2015). Others argue, 
however, that “a systematic prevalence of stronger parties . . . is taken [to indi-
cate that] the rule of law is pursued less diligently” (Schultz & Dupont 2015). 
By looking at the nationality of the home states of the investors, for example, 
one study showed that investors from the wealthiest countries were less likely 
to have their claims dismissed on jurisdictional grounds (McArthur & Or-
machea 2009). 
These trends reveal fundamental imbalances within ISDS– both structur-
ally between investors and states, and, in practice, between developed and de-
veloping countries. Introducing TPF, an inherently one-sided funding oppor-
tunity, into such a system could create a wealth of unknown impacts. It has the 
potential, certainly, of increasing the number of cases against vulnerable states 
and driving up the costs of arbitration through supply-side pressure. There still 
may be good reasons for permitting TPF, however, and we continue by exam-
ining those reasons one-by-one. 
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF TPF: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Those who would support the continued access of TPF in the investment 
arbitration context rely on four principal arguments. First, they argue that TPF 
promotes access to justice for claimants who have meritorious claims and 
would otherwise be unable to bring a costly suit against a state. Second, they 
point out that, at least in theory, TPF is available to both sides of the dispute, 
using anecdotal examples to suggest that TPF may become more available 
fund defendants in the future. Third, they claim that funders can offer a “disin-
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terested, dispassionate and highly detailed assessment of claims,” and indeed, 
that it is in their best interest to do so, thus reducing the incidence of weak or 
spurious claims filed. Finally, proponents highlight the functional similarity 
between TPF and other types of funding to argue that it should be treated simi-
larly (i.e., universally permitted).2 Depending on the viability of these claims, 
TPF may offer some benefits that would balance out concerns about state sov-
ereignty and public policy. 
A. Does TPF Contribute Substantially to Access to Justice, in Particular for 
Claimants Without Other Resources? 
Proponents of TPF seem to speak out of both sides of their mouth when it 
comes to this argument. On the one hand, they argue that TPF is necessary so 
that all the truly meritorious claims can be brought before an impartial tribunal 
and decided fairly.3 When the doctrines of maintenance and champerty 
reigned, the main argument for allowing contingency fee arrangements (argua-
bly, a type of TPF or functionally similar to TPF) was for the benefit of the 
poor and middle-income plaintiff. However, that is not the norm in internation-
al arbitration today: “[M]uch of the focus of the litigation finance market today 
is on the growing corporate utilization of funding by large, well-resourced enti-
ties, who are looking for ways to manage risk, reduce legal budgets, or take the 
cost of pursuing arbitration off-balance sheet” (ICCA-QMUL 2017, 13). JLT 
Specialty, Ltd., a litigation funder, points out deliberately that “[TPF] is not 
just for those that have no means to pay legal fees. Business[es] and wealthy 
individuals are making greater use of [TPF]. Rather than paying lawyers, using 
[TPF] ensures [that] cash flow is not tied up in the dispute” (JLT 2018).4 
Furthermore, the causality between the rising costs of international arbi-
tration and the presence of TPF is unknown. One study of TPF in Australian 
courts demonstrated that there was a correlation between the increased use of 
TPF and the number of cases in the court system (Chen 2015).5 While propo-
nents argue TPF is a response to rising costs, and thus, a rising demand for 
more funding, those costs could be partially attributable to the availability of 
additional funds as well. Finally, the apparent urgent need for “access to jus-
                                                                                                                           
 2 There is a fifth argument, that due to the wide use of TPF in other (domestic law and commer-
cial arbitration) contexts, it must be a legitimate way to fund cases. Since I address that argument 
above in Part I, supra, I do not go into more detail below. 
  3 For a more detailed analysis of this Access to Justice argument in the TPF context, see Tara 
Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett, Essay, Third-Party Funding in Investment Arbitration: Misappropri-
ation of Access to Justice Rhetoric by Global Speculative Finance, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. (forth-
coming 2019), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/8/. 
 4 JLT Specialty, Ltd. points this out in response to the question: “I can pay my legal fees. Why 
should I use [TPF]?” 
 5 In that particular study, Chen also tested whether the high number of court cases was driving the 
demand for litigation funding. Chen found no significant correlation. See Chen 2015. 
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tice” is diminished somewhat by the argument that TPF is functionally similar 
to other sources of litigation funding, which I discuss below. 
B. Is TPF Truly Available to Both Sides of Any Investor-State Dispute? 
Those who would support the equality of opportunity inherent in TPF 
point to the theoretical possibility that financing could be made available even 
to respondent states in ISDS. Indeed, there are two key cases that show how 
probable such a situation would be. In the first case, Philip Morris v. Uruguay, 
the investor brought a claim against Uruguay for their tobacco regulations, 
which impacted the value of their investment. With the very clear public health 
concerns involved, Uruguay was able to seek out financing from the Bloom-
berg Foundation and its “Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids” to support their 
defense. In that case, the funder was not moved by the possibility of any finan-
cial recourse, but instead by its own interests in protecting states’ tobacco laws. 
The second case was RSM v. Grenada, in which Global Petroleum Group 
funded Grenada’s defense against RSM’s claims. In that case, there were alle-
gations that Global Petroleum had been promised the oil exploration rights 
previously revoked from RSM—which they were subsequently awarded (ITN 
2010). 
Outside of corporate-government collusion, there are two ways in which 
TPF might become more available to respondent states: pro bono funding (as 
seen in Philip Morris) and portfolio funding. There is some speculation that 
corporations and civil society would continue to mobilize to support countries 
in their efforts to uphold globally accepted values, such as public health, labor 
rights and environmental protection. It is certainly possible for multinational 
corporations to begin to fund cases that would improve their corporate image 
and help them fulfill some of their commitments toward corporate social re-
sponsibility. In those cases, the corporate sponsor would be highly incentivized 
to disclose not only the fact of their involvement, but also key details of the 
arrangement (e.g., amount of funding). Pro bono funding is not very likely, 
however, in the context of cases not involving larger issues of public goods or 
the global commons. 
Proponents of TPF have also posited that portfolio funding could be used 
to support respondent states. In portfolio funding, an investor or multiple in-
vestors would fund a portfolio of cases, usually within a short span of time. In 
this case, the investor mitigates some of the risk of loss of one case, by receiv-
ing a return based on the “overall net financial performance of the claims” 
(ICCA-QMUL 2017, 29). Portfolio investing is a very common investing strat-
egy, allowing investors to combine high risk/high reward and low risk/low re-
ward investments. As applied to the high risk/no reward circumstance of fund-
ing respondent states, however, it seems highly unlikely that funders would 
2942 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2935 
employ these risk sharing tools.  Even a successful outcome for a state will not 
net a positive financial return to the portfolio, given that the only financial re-
covery a state may make is some portion of its legal fees and costs. 
C. Does TPF “Add Value” by Introducing a Disinterested, Dispassionate 
and Highly Detailed Assessment of Claims? 
Many TPF proponents point out that it would be an unwise financial deci-
sion to fund a case that is weak on the merits. Correspondingly, funders often 
engage in a comprehensive assessment of the details of the case before agree-
ing to partner with the claimant. Statistics show that they reject 90 percent of 
the cases that come before them. This evidence suggests that TPF does not 
contribute to spurious claims, driving up the number and cost of arbitration 
cases. 
Given the possibility of relying on portfolio funding, however, it seems 
that high risk/high reward cases (those that may be weaker on the merits but 
would bring in a large award if won), may very well be considered by typical 
third-party funders. Mick Smith, co-founder of Calunius Capital, is often quot-
ed as pointing out that “the perception that you need strong merits is wrong—
there’s price for everything” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2009). Jonathan 
Molot from Burford Capital, while emphasizing that funders primarily seek 
meritorious claims, also indicates that “[i]nvestment funds, in contrast [with 
insurers] are happy to bet on litigation if the returns are high enough” (Molot 
2015). There have also been instances of litigation financing gone wrong—
where the investor failed to do their due diligence and perpetuated frivolous 
lawsuits.6 Although the evidence here is anecdotal, the possibility of TPF con-
tributing to claimants bringing unmeritorious claims and the temptation by 
funders to take on large risks in the face of possibly large rewards is enough to 
suggest that TPF should, at the very least, be subject to careful oversight. 
A second consideration in determining the third-party funders’ ability to 
provide a disinterested assessment of claims is the interconnectedness between 
funders, attorneys and arbitrators involved in TPF. Due, in part, to the newness 
of the phenomenon and to the highly-specialized knowledge required to assess 
claims under investment treaties, the pool of experts involved is relatively 
small. Combined with the rising number of cases involving TPF, this small 
segment of society is finding itself repeatedly thrown together in arbitration. 
Even proponents of TPF acknowledge the “highly concentrated segment of the 
funding industry that invests in international arbitration cases, [as well as] the 
                                                                                                                           
 6 In the case of Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc and Others, the tribunal determined 
that the claims were “spurious”, “contrived”, and “grossly exaggerated”, among other similar de-
scriptors. Despite that, funders had provided up to £31.75 million over three years. See Excalibur 
Ventures 2016. 
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symbiotic relationships between funders and a small group of law firms, and 
relatedly, the often close relations among elite law firms and leading arbitra-
tors” (ICCA-QMUL 2017). The potential for conflicts of interest, therefore, is 
very high. Furthermore, the interconnectedness creates incentives to perpetuate 
the system through the funding of more cases. To counteract these incentives 
and potential conflicts of interest, it seems we ought, at the very least, to in-
crease transparency in order to minimize predatory behavior and reinforce the 
integrity of the dispute system. 
D. Is TPF Functionally Similar to Other Funding Opportunities? 
The fourth argument supporting the use of TPF in international invest-
ment arbitration is its functional similarity with other funding opportunities. 
Proponents point out that claimants (and respondents) have other similar ways 
to finance litigation, including corporate and equity financing, political risk 
insurance, after-the-event insurance, and even attorneys’ contingency fee ar-
rangements, so there is no real reason to treat TPF with more suspicion than 
other similar arrangements. It is worth noting that the similarity of these other 
funding sources somewhat undercuts an earlier argument made, which is that 
TPF is necessary in order to afford access to justice (why do we not just rely 
on those?). Nevertheless, assuming (so the argument goes) that TPF is similar 
to these other mechanisms, perhaps we should not treat it differently by de-
manding more disclosure or, in some cases, an award of security for costs.7 
One alternative source of funding for claimants, especially corporate 
claimants, is to rely on internal corporate or equity financing. This is more like 
a traditional loan, allowing the company to shift costs internally with the hope 
of recouping the money with a successful case. It is similar to TPF in that it 
also provides non-recourse funding during the life of the claim. In structure, 
however, since the financier is (corporately) related to the complainant, that 
relationship is immediately discoverable in arbitration. Furthermore, the funder 
would not be a part of the “concentrated segment” of society already involved 
in TPF, which would change the calculus of incentives. Any conflicts that arise 
during the course of the case would be ordinarily resolved by corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms and other rules that govern corporate relationships. 
Insurance is another mechanism that claimants (and respondents) have 
used in the past to finance litigation. Insurance, like TPF, provides funding 
(sometimes non-recourse) for claimants bringing a claim under an investment 
                                                                                                                           
 7 One main concern of third-party funders and the claimants they would represent is that disclo-
sure of the relationships would lead the tribunal to award the respondent security for costs, for fear 
that claimants would not be able to pay costs if they were awarded against them. Funders argue that 
this is unfair prejudice against claimants and would delay the procedures and drive up costs. A full 
discussion of that argument is outside the scope of this paper, but I address the concern to a limited 
degree in discussing the specifics of disclosure, below. 
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treaty. Political Risk Insurance (PRI) is sold beforehand to cover the costs of 
possible future litigation. After-the-event (ATE) insurance is sought after a 
claim is brought to cover the costs once they are beginning to accrue. There are 
three key differences, however, between insurers and third-party funders. First 
of all, insurance companies do not provide day-to-day financing for the case, 
but pay the amount after the claimant has submitted a claim. Second, the insur-
ance premium is much lower on average than the typical return sought in a 
TPF arrangement. Third, insurance companies are bound by certain domestic 
regulation and professional rules of conduct. Insurance is considered a finan-
cial service, regulated under the country’s prudential financial regulations, 
bound by consumer protection rules and governed by licensing. Indeed, some 
have argued that TPF ought to be regulated under the same rules, as a financial 
service provider.8 
Finally, many have pointed to attorney-client contingency fee arrange-
ments, which provide non-recourse funding for complainants. This practice is 
much older than many of the previous options, and was originally envisioned 
for the purpose of the impecunious client who would not otherwise be able to 
seek justice for their meritorious claim.9 Contingency fees, however, are based 
on an already disclosed relationship—that of the attorney-client, so that hidden 
conflicts are not as likely to arise. Attorneys are also bound by the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility, which could result in disbarment in the case of 
gross violation of the rules, such as lawyers putting their contingent financial 
interest in the case ahead of the client’s best interests in settlement negotia-
tions. The main takeaway from each of these other funding opportunities is 
that they are often automatically disclosed in the arbitration process, and in 
each case, bound by other laws, regulations and codes of conduct. Since TPF is 
relatively new to the international investment arbitration regime, these safe-
guards are not yet in place consistently, which suggests that perhaps different 
treatment is merited. 
III. EXISTING AND PROPOSED WAYS OF REGULATING TPF 
As amply demonstrated, there are imbalances within ISDS, both structural-
ly and in practice, as well as significant weaknesses in the case for the value of 
TPF in international investment arbitration. Given the novelty of the practice, 
and the potential for abuse, we ought to seek more information about the positive 
and negative impacts of TPF on the rights and interests involved. In light of this, 
I argue that we need expansive disclosure of TPF arrangements to avoid conflicts 
of interest, to align with arbitration’s institutional movement toward transparen-
cy, and to provide information for ongoing empirical research. 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (2006). 
 9 As mentioned in Part II.A, supra. See Flake 2015. 
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A. Evolving Disclosure Rules 
Currently, there is no widespread requirement to disclose the presence or 
identity of third-party funders. The Canada-EU Trade Agreement (“CETA”), 
Article 8.26, for example, does include mandatory disclosure, while the Singa-
pore Investment Arbitration Commission (“SIAC”), Article 23(1) gives the 
tribunal power to order disclosure of the funder and details of the agreement, 
but it is not mandatory. In many jurisdictions, TPF is left unregulated. 
In the context of any litigation or arbitration, there are competing interests 
when it comes to disclosure vs. confidentiality. In this case, both parties have a 
strong interest in a determination by an unbiased tribunal as well as in a swift 
and final resolution of a dispute. Meanwhile, the claimant has some interest in 
keeping the funding relationship confidential for fear of how it will affect other 
procedural issues in the case. In a few instances, respondents have viewed the 
presence of a third-party funder as evidence that the claimant will be unable to 
pay costs at the end of case, should the tribunal shift costs. A request for secu-
rity for costs can result in a delay of the process and drive up the actual costs 
of the arbitration. Claimants and funders alike view this outcome as unneces-
sarily punishing claimants for using outside funding. 
The likelihood of accidental or delayed disclosure, however, as well as 
the high cost to both parties in the event that an award is set aside, suggests 
that the interests in disclosure substantially outweigh those in confidentiality. 
The general consensus, therefore, is that both the existence and identity of a 
third-party funder should be disclosed—though practitioners differ with re-
spect to who they believe ought to bear the burden of disclosing such infor-
mation. 
In the past decade, institutions governing international investment arbitra-
tion have begun to transition toward greater transparency in all their proceed-
ings. Both ICSID (in 2006) and UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law) (in 2013) modified their arbitration rules to increase 
transparency. In view of that trend, TPF should also be treated with more 
transparency. Although this approach does not go all the way towards demon-
strating the importance of disclosing the substance of funding agreements, it 
does show a general trend toward favoring transparency in the current institu-
tional framework. 
In addition to the current institutional needs of international investment 
governance, we ought to maintain a long-term investment in the legitimacy of 
these institutions. In order to support that, however, we need to provide ongo-
ing research into the role of third-party funders. Since third-party funders are 
relatively new to this context, we do not know much about their direct and in-
direct impacts, the kinds of cases that will be funded, and the kinds of out-
comes that will be seen. Proponents speculate that TPF will promote greater 
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(and much needed) investment in developing countries because investors will 
feel more comfortable that their rights and interests will be preserved. Critics 
speculate on the other hand that it will increase both the cost and the amount of 
litigation, leading to draining State balance sheets and ultimately a regulatory 
chill. An even stronger argument put forth by Boston College Law School’s 
Professor Frank Garcia is that TPF constitutes an “unjustifiable wealth trans-
fer” from the developing world to the financial sector, amounting to “deliber-
ate exploitation of the system”.10 However, until we have data, we cannot 
know the truth of any of these statements. And in order to gather this data, we 
need mandatory, expansive disclosure of TPF agreements: disclosing not only 
the existence and identity of third-party funders, but also the general structure 
of these funding agreements, the financial situation of the funded party, the 
expected return on the investment, as well as the control, priority and risk 
alignment provisions. 
B. Expansive Disclosure 
Funding agreements vary in their terms, but often contain the same main 
components. One the most important aspects is the control that the funder 
might exercise over litigation decisions. It makes sense that funders would 
have an interest in whether and when a claimant would decide to settle as op-
posed to pushing for an arbitral win. However, that makes the claimants ex-
traordinarily vulnerable to the underlying profit-based incentives motivating 
the funder. 
Funding agreements also lay out the return structure of the arrangement 
(how much the funder will make in the event of a win), the priority agreement 
(who gets the money first) and a risk alignment section (who bears the risk of 
increased costs and fees over initial predictions). All of these components are 
helpful in determining whether the funder is undertaking an appropriate 
amount of risk in the claim, and where the incentives lie for the claimant, the 
funder and the lawyers. Expansive disclosure, or total disclosure of TPF 
agreements could address many of the concerns, both on the side of the re-
spondent and the claimant. First, it could alleviate concerns that delayed or 
accidental disclosure would lead to an award set aside or a miscarriage of jus-
tice for the claimant and the respondent. Second, increased transparency of the 
funding agreements aligns well with the general institutional trend toward 
transparency and highlights funding agreement provisions that create perverse 
incentives. For funded parties, mandatory disclosure could normalize TPF, 
leading to fewer orders of security for costs. Finally, expansive disclosure will 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Frank J. Garcia, Third-Party Funding as Exploitation of the Investment Treaty System, 59 B.C. 
L. REV. 2911 (2018). 
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provide the much needed data for future research into the benefits and harms 
involved in TPF and enable more effective regulation going forward. 
One way to approach this is to incorporate TPF rules into new trade 
agreements, as Canada and the European Union have done. This would work 
well for new treaties, but would be time consuming and costly for older trea-
ties that have been in place for decades. Another option, which could provide a 
more rapid change throughout the investment arbitration system, would be to 
modify or expand arbitration rules for institutions like the ICC, ICSID, and 
UNCITRAL, all of which are already actively involved in related rulemaking. 
Whichever approach we take, language which combines the mandatory 
disclosure of CETA Article 8.2611 with the voluntary expansive disclosure of 
SIAC Article 2412 could accomplish the goal. The Canada-Europe agreement, 
as mentioned above, makes disclosure mandatory for any TPF, either at the 
time of the submission of a claim or as soon as the funding agreement is con-
cluded. The disclosure obligation is set squarely on the shoulders of the funded 
party and is non-discretionary. By contrast, the obligation under SIAC places 
the responsibility of ordering disclosure on the tribunal, while also giving them 
the power to uncover certain details of the funding arrangement. 
An expansive disclosure provision may put the burden of disclosure on 
the funded party, for example: 
Where there is third-party funding, the disputing party benefiting 
from it shall disclose to the other disputing party and to the Tribunal 
the name and address of the third-party funder as well as amount of 
funding, the expected recourse in the case of a successful outcome 
                                                                                                                           
 11 CETA, art. 8.26 provides:  
1. Where there is third-party funding, the disputing party benefiting from it shall dis-
close to the other disputing party and to the Tribunal the name and address of the third-
party funder. 
2. The disclosure shall be made at the time of the submission of a claim, or, if the fi-
nancing agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is made after the submission of 
a claim, without delay as soon as the agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is 
made. 
Id. 
 12 SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules (2017) Art. 24:  
 
Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, in addition to the other powers specified in these Rules, 
and except as prohibited by the mandatory rules of law applicable to the arbitration, the Tribu-
nal Shall have the power to: 
(l) order the disclosure of the existences of a Party’s third-party funding arrangement 
and/or the identity of the third-party funder and, where appropriate, details of the third-
party funder’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and/or whether or not the 
third-party funder has committed to undertake adverse costs liability[.] 
Id. art. 24(l). 
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and any other provisions which may affect the decision-making of 
the funded party. 
Another provision may give the tribunal the responsibility to order full disclo-
sure of the agreement as a matter of course: 
The Tribunal shall order the disclosure of the existence of any Par-
ty’s third-party funding arrangement, as well as the identity of the 
funder, the amount of the funding, expected recourse in the case of a 
successful outcome, and any other provisions which the Tribunal 
deems relevant to the decision-making power of the funded party. 
Other models may give the Tribunal more discretion in deciding which por-
tions of the funding agreement are important to disclose in any particular case. 
All of these texts would serve the purposes of avoiding conflicts of interest, 
protecting against awards set-aside, ensuring ongoing transparency within 
ISDS, and providing data for future research into the role of TPF. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: RORSCHACH TESTS AND REAL DATA 
Rusty Park has said that TPF, like ISDS, acts as a bit of a Rorschach test 
for researchers. He said that our conclusions say more about the researcher 
than about the process itself (Park 2017). Assuming that TPF represents just 
another market for investors to grow their capital and ISDS is just another in-
ternational legal process, what should keep a corporation from making a cor-
porate decision to get a “loan,” so to speak, in order to bring a lawsuit? So 
what if that loan is a very special kind of loan where the lender recovers only if 
the plaintiff succeeds? In a place where the freedom to control one’s own 
property (and not to have a government interfere with its use or value) is held 
in high esteem, it seems that TPF is nothing over which we should lose sleep. 
But some jurisdictions have begun to recognize that there are a few addi-
tional factors playing a role here. First, ISDS is a very specific, and particular 
kind of international legal process. It represents a very specific exception to the 
rule of sovereign immunity—in which a country cannot be sued outside of its 
own state courts. States consent to the jurisdiction of these international legal 
institutions as a concession to investors who have had a historical difficulty 
seeking redress for economic wrongs in the domestic courts of the investor’s 
host state. Second, respondent states in international investment arbitration are 
in a unique position given that many of the measures complained of are 
measures “of general public interest”—environmental laws, labor protections, 
and other social and economic rights. 
Despite the fact that TPF is currently accepted in the realm of internation-
al investment arbitration, and that critics calling for it to be banned have been 
unable to “move the needle” in terms of making practical changes, as some 
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experts have said, we ought not to give in and accept that TPF is here to stay. 
The ISDS system itself has been in place for more than 50 years, yet even now, 
in light of empirical evidence demonstrating some of its weaknesses, countries 
are pushing back on the status quo. In 2011, Australia announced that it would 
no longer include ISDS provisions in its trade agreements. Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela have terminated several investment agreements and withdrawn 
from ICSID. If, at 50 years old, the ISDS system can be re-examined (and in 
some cases discarded), then TPF may be as well. 
As with any legal practice or institution, we ought to welcome ongoing 
scrutiny which pushes us to provide greater justice with greater transparency 
and consistency. Expansive disclosure could make this scrutiny possible. 
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